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1  Introduction 
The  risk  of  default  that  business  firms  face  is  very  significant  and  differs  widely  across 
countries. CreditReform (2007; 2009), a private research institute and consultancy, documents 
that the risk of insolvency varies markedly even within Europe. Using index numbers and a 
benchmark value of 100 for Germany, CreditReform documents that the risk of firm default is 
perceived to be as low as 47 for Scandinavian countries and as high as 161 for countries in 
Eastern Europe (cf. Figure 1). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
A nascent strand of research hypothesizes that policies and institutions that affect the business 
climate in a broadly defined way are central for the understanding of firm dynamics, and so in 
particular for business exits (Bartelsmann et al. 2009). Business conditions, which comprehend 
legal and institutional factors, a country’s infrastructure and microeconomic policies as well as 
macroeconomic factors, differ widely across countries in Europe and even more so worldwide. 
Hence, one is pushed to stipulate that these conditions are important determinants of producer 
dynamics. The business environment is also shaped by a country’s embedment into world trade, 
notably by its trade agreements, trade policies and trade infrastructure. Recent evidence shows 
that the import competition associated with trade and trade liberalization has a strong impact on 
firm  exits  (see,  inter  alia,  Bernard  et  al.  2009;  Greenaway  et  al.  2008;  Colantone  and 
Sleuwaegen 2010; Colantone, Coucke and Sleuwaegen 2010). 
In  highlighting  the  roles  of  policies  and  institutions  and  in  providing  evidence  about  their 
important  roles,  this  recent  research  has  contributed  much  to  our  understanding  of  the 
determinants of business exits. What this line of research has not addressed so far and what is as 
yet not well understood in the literature is the role that particular business factors play for the 
country-specific exit risks and how these factors interact with trade and trade liberalization. For 
example, what are the roles of market size, technology policies, and entry regulation policies for 
the risk of business exit? How do international differences in the business infrastructure play out 
and what is their significance if trade is liberalized? These are the questions that we address in 
this paper. 
Theoretical guidance is needed to make progress with regard to these issues. Accordingly, it is 
the  aim  of  this  paper  to  explore  the  links  between  countries’  business  conditions  and 
international trade embedment and the default risk at the country level from a theoretical point 
of view. Our main contribution is to set up a general equilibrium model which allows us to 2 
derive sharp predictions concerning how key factors which shape a country’s business and trade 
environment  impact  on  the  default  risk  of  firms.  We  also  provide  a  first  cursory  look  at 
empirical data which reveals that our predictions are consistent with the observations. Hence, 
our  model  promises  to  be  an  adequate  starting  point  for  further  and  deeper  empirical 
investigations. 
Our theoretical model considers two countries and two sectors and takes into account that firms 
are  heterogeneous  in  two  dimensions.  First,  following  the  recent  theories  of  heterogeneous 
firms  and  trade,  we  assume  that  firms  in  the  manufacturing  sector  differ  in  terms  of  their 
productivities (see, in particular, Melitz 2003, and Redding 2010 for a recent survey). Second, 
we  assume  that  the  default  risk  of  firms  is  inversely  related  to  their  productivity.  This 
assumption draws on the empirical fact that less productive firms are much more likely to exit 
markets than more productive ones, a finding that has consistently been obtained for a large 
number of countries.
1 Apparently, more productive firms dispose of greater ability to adapt to 
their environment and to make higher profits and, hence, have a greater buffer against adverse 
shocks. This important finding is not taken into account in the Melitz (2003) model and the 
voluminous literature it has inspired. Rather, these works assume that all firms, irrespective of 
their productivity, face an identical default risk which is also identical across countries. 
Our  theoretical  analysis  focuses  on  how  country-specific  exit  rates  are  shaped  by  business 
conditions in the long-run.
2 Hence, we explore the steady-state equilibrium of our model. We 
derive a number of sharp theoretical predictions. First, the expected risk of business exit falls 
when a country moves from autarky to trade. Intuitively, trade opening induces a competition 
effect which drives up the productivity threshold to survive and hence the average productivity 
of firms. The country-specific default risk falls as firms become more productive on average. 
Second,  the  effect  of  trade  integration  on  the  country-specific  default  risk  depends  on  the 
liberalization  path  and  on  the  country’s  business  conditions  relative  to  those  of  its  trading 
partners. More specifically, a country that opens up unilaterally and grants foreign firms better 
access to its consumers experiences an increase in its default risk whilst the default risk in the 
trading partner country falls. A symmetric trade integration path reduces the default risk in the 
two countries if and only if the business conditions in these countries are similar. As soon as 
                                                 
1 Drawing on a panel of manufacturing plants in the United States, Dunne et al. (1988), Bailey et al. (1992), Doms 
et al. (1995) and Bernard et al. (2006) document that productivity has a sizable negative effect on the probability of 
firm exit. Similar findings have been obtained for the UK (Disney et al. 2003), for France (Bellone et al. 2006), for 
Sweden (Greenaway et al. 2008), for Spain (Esteve-Pérez and Mañez-Castillejo 2008), and for Portugal (Carreira 
and Teixeira 2009). The link between firm characteristics and entry and exit rates is also highlighted by Einav and 
Levin (2010) in their progress report on recent developments in the industrial organization literature. 
2 We abstract both from the business cycle as well as from short-run adjustment processes. 3 
one  country  has  significantly  better  business  conditions  on  average  (we  make  this  concept 
precise in our theoretical analysis), this country experiences a fall in its default risk while the 
risk  of  business  exit  rises  in  the  other  country.  Third,  turning  to  the  effects  of  business 
conditions for a given state of trade integration, we show the following: A country’s default risk 
is independent of the size of its population and the size of its trading partner. The country 
specific-default risk rises when entry investments in this (the other) country rise (fall), when its 
(the other country’s) technical potential falls (rises) and when wage costs in this (the other) 
country rise (fall). The effect of an increase in the fixed investments necessary to supply the 
domestic market (i.e. for a distribution or retailing network, the costs of contract enforcement or 
corruption expenditures) on a country’s default risk is to decrease the default risk if trade is 
sufficiently costly, whilst the default risk in the other country unambiguously falls.  
In addition to the strand of research which has begun to analyze producer dynamics across 
countries that we already alluded to
3, this paper is also related to the emerging literature that 
explores the consequences of country differences and policy issues in new trade models with 
heterogeneous firms. Key works are Bernard et al. (2007) who address the effects of differences 
in  relative  factor  endowments,  Melitz  and  Ottaviano  (2008)  who  scrutinize  differences  in 
market-size and trade costs, Demidova (2008) and Falvey et al. (2005) who focus on differences 
in the technology potential across countries, Baldwin (2005), Baldwin and Forslid (2006) and 
Feenstra and Kee (2008) who study the welfare effects of trade integration and Demidova and 
Rodriguez-Clare (2009) who analyze trade policy and welfare issues from the point of view of a 
small open economy.
4 Importantly, none of the mentioned works accounts for the heterogeneity 
of the default risk at the firm level that we highlight in our analysis, and therefore none of these 
contributions is able to address the heterogeneity of default risks at the country level. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Our basic model which features two sectors, a monopolistic 
competitive industry and a traditional constant returns sector, is laid out in section 2. Section 3 
derives the open economy equilibrium with two countries. Section 4 contains our analysis of 
country-specific default risks. Section 5 discusses the predictions of the model in the light of 
readily available data. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
                                                 
3 See also the volume edited by Dunne et al. (2009). 
4 A number of further works deserve to be mentioned. Chor (2009) studies FDI subsidies in a two-country setting 
with heterogeneous firms, Jorgenson and Schröder (2008) explore the effects of exogenous tariffs and Cole and 
Davis (2009) analyze optimal tariffs. Pflüger and Südekum (2009) focus on entry costs and entry subsidies and 
study the non-cooperative and cooperative choice entry subsidies. Pflüger and Russek (2011) highlight the role of 
country asymmetries for trade and industrial policies.  4 
2  The Model 
2.1  General set-up 
Our model builds on a version of the monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms 
(Melitz  2003)  due  to  Demidova  (2008).  There  are  two  industries,  a  traditional  numéraire 
industry, n, which produces a homogeneous good under constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition  and  a  monopolistic  competitive  industry,  c ,  which  produces  a  continuum  of 
differentiated manufacturing varieties under increasing returns. Each variety is produced by a 
single  firm  and  firms  are  heterogeneous  in  their  productivity.  Labor  is  the  only  factor  of 
production in both industries. There are L workers who supply one unit of labor each.  
Previous works in the tradition of Melitz (2003) counterfactually assumed that all firms face an 
identical default risk irrespectively of their productivity. In contrast, we assume that the default 
risk of a firm is inversely related to its productivity, as consistently found in the empirical 
literature.  We  also  consider  an  extensive  list  of  business  factors:  country  asymmetries 
concerning the effective entry costs, the fixed costs to serve domestic and foreign consumers, 
respectively, trade and transport infrastructure, and productivity differences in the competitive 
sector, as well as country size differences. We first look at a single autarkic country. 
2.2  Preferences 
Preferences of household h are defined over the homogenous numéraire commodity and the set 
of differentiated varieties,  W Î z , according to a logarithmic quasi-linear utility function with 
CES sub-utility 
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where  1 0 < < r  and  0 > b  are constant parameters and where  ( ) z q
h  expresses household h's 
consumption of variety  z . The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is given by 
1 ) 1 /( 1 > - º r s . It is well-known from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) that 
h c  can be understood as 
the consumption of the manufacturing aggregate with aggregate price 

















dz z p P          (2) 
The budget constraint of an individual is 
h h h y n c P = + , where 
h y  denotes income. Standard 
utility maximization implies that per-capita expenditure on the manufacturing aggregate and the 
numéraire are given by  b =
h c P  and  b - =
h h y n , respectively. Indirect utility is of the form 5 
) 1 (ln ln - + - = b b b P y v
h h . The index h will be dropped from now on since households are 
identical.  We  impose  the  assumption  y < b  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  demand  for  the 
homogeneous  good  is  non-negative.  Aggregate  demand  for  a  single  variety  z  is  given  by 
L P z p z q b
s s 1 ) ( ) (
- - = , and total revenue for that variety is  [ ] L z p P z q z p z r b
s 1 ) ( / ) ( ) ( ) (
- = = . 
Overall expenditures on manufacturing goods, PcL , equal  L b . 
2.3  Production and pricing 
In the numéraire-sector a units of labor are transformed into one unit of output. This pins down 
the wage at  a w / 1 = . Technologies in the modern sector are such that  j / q f l + =  units of 
labor are needed to produce q units of output. The fixed overhead labor  f  is the same for all 
firms, but the variable labor requirement ( ) j / 1  differs across firms. Firms have zero mass. Each 
firm thus faces a residual demand curve with constant price elasticity of demand  s - . Profit 
maximization implies that a firm with marginal cost ( j / w ) charges the price: 
         








) (         (3) 
Revenue and profits of this firm are then given by  ( ) ( )
1 /
- =
s rj b j w P L r  and  f w r - = s j p / ) ( , 
respectively. Hence, the firm with higher productivity level j  charges a lower price, sells a 
larger quantity and has higher revenue and profits. Since all firm-specific variables differ only 
with respect to j , the CES price index (2) can be rewritten as  
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where M  denotes the mass of manufacturing firms (and varieties) in the market,  ( ) j m  is the 
productivity distribution across these active firms (with positive support over a subset of ( ) ¥ , 1 ) 
and j ~  is an average productivity level of firms in the market as introduced by Melitz (2003). 
2.4  Entry, exit and parameterization 
There exists a mass of potential entrepreneurs who can enter the manufacturing sector subject to 
a sunk entry investment in terms of labor  e f . At each point in time a mass of 
E M  entrepreneurs 
decides to enter. Upon  entry these entrepreneurs learn about their productivity j , which is 
drawn from a common and known density function  ) (j g  with support ( ) ¥ , 1  and cumulative 
density function  ) (j G . We call this the 'productivity lottery'. After the productivity level is 
revealed, an entrant can decide to exit immediately or to remain active in the market, in which 6 
case  the  firm  earns  constant  per-period  profits  ( ) j p .  It  will  exit  immediately  if 
( ) ( ) f w r s j j p < « < 0 . Only those firms remain active whose productivity draw exceeds the 
cutoff  0
* > j  at which profits are zero,  ( ) 0
* = j p .  
Once in the market, every firm may be hit by a lethal shock which forces it to shut down and 
exit the industry.
5 The empirical evidence that we have discussed in section 1 strongly suggests 
that  less  productive  firms  face  a  higher  risk  of  market  exit  than  more  productive  ones.  A 
tractable way to express this notion is to assume that the firm-specific death rate is given by 
j j d / 1 ) ( = . We focus on a stationary equilibrium without time discounting such that in each 
period the mass of entrants which successfully enter the market equals the mass of firms that are 
forced to shut down. Analytically,  ( ) [ ]M E M prob
E
i
* j j j d > = , where  ( ) [ ]
* j j j d > E  is the 
expected rate of firm death and  ( )
* 1 j G probi - =  is the probability to draw a productivity no 
smaller than the cutoff 
* j . 
Our novel assumption that a firm’s exit risk negatively depends on its productivity involves 
considerable  intricacies.  To  see  this  it  is  useful  to  recall  the  standard  Melitz  model  which 
assumes  that  a  firm’s  exit  risk  is  constant.  It  is  well-known  from  Melitz  (2003)  that  this 
assumption together with the market entry lottery implies that in a stationary equilibrium the 
distribution of firms in the market,  ( ) j m , coincides with the conditional (left-truncated) ex-ante 
distribution  ) (j g . Parameterizations of this standard Melitz-model usually stipulate that the ex-
ante  distribution  of  firm  productivities  is  a  Pareto-distribution,  i.e.  ( )
k G j j j / 1 ) ( min - =  and 
( )
1
min ' ) (
- - = =
k k k G g j j j j  where  1 min > j  is the lower bound for productivity draws which can 
be  understood  to  capture  a  country’s  technology  potential,  and  where  1 > k  is  the  shape 
parameter (e.g. Helpman et al. 2004; Baldwin 2005). Under this parameterization, the ex-ante 
distribution of productivities, the conditional ex-ante distribution and the distribution of firms in 
a steady state equilibrium follow a Pareto-distribution. Moreover, the Pareto-parameterization is 
appealing  because  it  conforms  with  the  empirical  evidence  concerning  the  productivities  of 
firms that are observed in the markets.
6  
However, if the exit risk of firms is productivity-dependent, it no longer holds true that the 
distribution of firms in a steady state equilibrium,  ( ) j m , coincides with the conditional (left-
                                                 
5 We follow Melitz (2003) and assume that once a firm is hit by a lethal shock it leaves the market instantaneously. 
Hopenhayn (1992) offers a dynamic analysis of firm exit. Atkeson and Burstein (2010) extend the Melitz-model in 
the spirit of Hopenhayn. 
6 See e.g. Del Gatto et al. (2006) and Ikeda and Suoma (2009). 7 
truncated)  ex-ante  distribution  ) (j g .  Intuitively,  unlike  in  the  Melitz-model,  the  sample  of 
exiting firms is now systematically biased towards firms with lower productivities. In fact, even 
if we specified the ex-ante distribution of productivities to be a Pareto-distribution, it is unclear 
what the implied distribution of productivities in a stationary market equilibrium would look 
like. To cut through these complications we proceed inversely: the empirical evidence tells us 
that the distribution of firm productivities in the market is a Pareto whilst we do not know and 
cannot observe how the ex-ante distribution of firm productivities looks like. Hence, we impose 
the Pareto-parameterization for the stationary equilibrium and we allow the ex-ante distribution 
) (j g  and its left-truncation to be unknown. We merely have to assume that  ) (j g  together with 
the  productivity  dependent  exit  process  (where  j j d / 1 ) ( = )  generate  a  stable  market 
equilibrium that leads to a Pareto distribution of active firms. These assumptions suffice to 
solve our model with productivity-dependent exit risks. 
2.5  Equilibrium in the closed economy 
The equilibrium within the manufacturing sector can be characterized as in Melitz (2003) by 
two conditions, a free entry condition (FEC) and a zero cutoff profit condition (ZCPC). The 
FEC captures the individual market entry decisions of entrepreneurs which are based on the 
productivity distribution in the productivity lottery. To derive the FEC note that, assuming risk 
neutrality, potential entrepreneurs enter the market (i.e. incur the entry cost  e f w  to participate 
in  the  productivity  lottery)  until  the  value  of  entry 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]
* *
0
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t E  is 
driven to zero. The resulting FEC is given by (see appendix A): 
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f w e       (5) 
where  [ ]
s s j j j E j
/ 1 * ' > º  is a suitably defined auxiliary expected productivity. Note that the 
entrepreneurs base their entry decisions solely on the distribution in the productivity lottery. 
Hence, all expected values (this includes  ' j ) depend only on the distribution in the lottery and 
are independent of the distribution of active firms. The distribution of active firms influences 
the revenue of a firm through the price index, as  ( ) ( )
1 /
- =
s rj b j w P L r . However, since our 
calculations involve the ratio  ( ) ( ) j j ¢ r r , the price index cancels out. 8 
The  ZCPC  states  that  the  cutoff  firm  makes  zero  profits,  ( ) ( ) f w r s j j p = « =
* * 0 .  Using 
( ) ( ) [ ] f w r - = s j j p / ' ' ,  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j
s ¢ ¢ =
-
r r
1 * * / ,  this  condition  can  be  expressed  as  a 
function of the auxiliary average productivity level j¢: 























j p           (6) 
Although  this  ZCPC  corresponds  qualitatively  to  the  one  stated  in  Melitz  (2003)  we  have 
formulated  it  in  terms  of  ' j  to  facilitate  the  derivations  that  follow.  The  equilibrium  is 
determined  by  the  productivity 
*
aut j  which  simultaneously  satisfies  the  FEC  and  the  ZCPC. 
Equating eqs. (5) and (6), using  ( ) j j d ¢ = ¢ / 1 ,  [ ] j j j
j
j j j E j
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* ) ( ) ( 1
* * ,  the  cutoff 
* j  is  implicitly  defined  by  the  equilibrium 
condition: 
( ) ( ) e aut aut f g j f = ×























* *        (7) 
The LHS of eq. (7) is the present discounted value of the expected profits, the RHS shows the 
entry investment. In appendix B we show that  ( ) ( )
* *, j j g j f ×  is a decreasing function in 
* j  and 
intersects  e f  only once. This ensures the uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
Once the equilibrium cutoff 
*
aut j  is determined, the average productivity of firms in the market 
can be derived as in Melitz (2003) as well as the expected (average) exit rate of the economy. In 
order to conform to the empirical evidence and to obtain closed-form solutions we assume that 
the productivities of firms in the market follow a Pareto-distribution as specified in the previous 
section.  The  average  productivity  is  then  given  by  ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) * 1 / 1 1 / ~ j s j
s- - - = k k .  Using 
j j d / 1 ) ( = , the expected exit rate can be derived as:  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
1 * * 1 /
-
+ = > j j j j d k k E . Making 
use of the equilibrium condition (7) we obtain: 
PROPOSITION 1. (Country-specific default risk under autarky). The expected (average) 
risk  of  business  exit  in  a  closed  economy,  is  independent  of  country  size  L  and  the  labor 
coefficient in the traditional sector a, negatively related to the degree of competition s , the 9 
technological potential and the fixed labor input to the serve market  f , and positively related 
to the fixed investment of entry labor  e f . 
Proof. The proposition is proven by implicit differentiation of eq. (7) as shown in appendix B. ■ 
A remark concerning our conceptualization of a country’s technology potential is in order here: 
As  we  depart  from  a  general  ex-ante  distribution  of  firm  productivities,  ) (j g ,  we  model 
differences  in  technological  potential  by  hazard  rate  stochastic  dominance  (HRSD)  as  in 
Demidova  (2008).  A  productivity  distribution  ( ) j a G  stochastically  dominates  a  distribution 
( ) j b G  in  terms  of  the  hazard  rate  order,  ( ) ( ) · · b hr a G G f ,  if 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] j j j j b b a a G g G g - < - 1 / 1 /  holds  true  for  any  given  productivity  level  j .  HRSD 
allows us to compare the expectations of an increasing function above a given cutoff level, i.e. 
if  ) (x y  is an increasing function, then  [ ] [ ] j j > > > x x y E x x y E F H ) ( ) ( . Put intuitively, firms 
drawing from  ( ) j a G  have a greater chance of getting a higher productivity level above this 
level than firms drawing from  ( ) j b G . In Appendix B we show that a HRSD technology implies 
a higher cutoff productivity.  
Proposition 1 highlights how particular business factors affect the country-specific default risk 
under  autarky.  A  greater  technological  potential  and/or  lower  investments  for  market  entry 
increase  the  expected  profitability  to  produce  manufacturing  goods.  This  stimulates  market 
entry  and  tightens  competition  and  thus  forces  the  least  productive  firms  to  close  down. 
Similarly, higher fixed labor investments set in a selection effect which drives the least efficient 
firms out of the market. Consequently, the average insolvency risk decreases as the average 
productivity of firm rises. The equilibrium cutoff-productivity 
*
aut j  is unaffected both by the 
country size and by the wage (which is tied to the labor coefficient in the competitive sector a). 
Clearly,  these  are  intermediate  results,  only,  since  they  do  not  involve  international 
repercussions. To explore these, we turn to the open economy now. 
3  The Open Economy 
3.1  Assumptions 
We now turn to an open economy setting with two countries  [ ] F H j i , , Î , say home H  and 
foreign  F .  These  two  countries  potentially  differ  in  a  number  of  characteristics  which 
determine the conditions of doing business. There may be differences in country size  i L  and in 10 
the labor coefficient in the competitive sector  i a . Technologies in the manufacturing sector do 
not have to be identical: we assume that entrants in country i draw their productivity from a 
country-specific  lottery  distribution  ( ) j i G  which  may  dominate  the  productivity  distribution 
( ) j j G  of the other country in terms of the hazard rate order. We also allow the fixed labor input 
for entry in the manufacturing sector  i e f ,  and the fixed labor input  i f  to serve domestic markets 
to differ across countries. If (after learning its productivity  i j ) a firm from country i decides to 
export to region  j  it faces an additional country-specific fixed cost  xi f , on top of the domestic 
per-period fixed costs  i f  that accrue irrespectively of export status. Moreover, firms have to 
incur variable iceberg costs to serve foreign consumers: for one unit to arrive in  j , a firm from 
country i has to ship  1 > ij t  units. We shall allow for the possibility that  ji ij t t ¹ , e.g. due to 
different trade policies or trade infrastructures. Trade in the competitive sector is costless. As 
long as both countries produce this good, an assumption that we shall maintain throughout the 
paper,  the  law  of  one  price  dictates  that  the  foreign  wage  is  tied  to  the  domestic  wage, 
F H H F a a w w W / / = º  where W  denotes the relative foreign wage. Note that  i i a w / 1 =  by our 
choice of the numéraire. 
3.2  The international equilibrium 
The  international  equilibrium  is  determined  by  the  conditions  of  free  entry  and  zero  cutoff 
profits which become interdependent across countries in the open economy. If a manufacturing 
firm  from  country  i  exports  to  country  j ,  its  profits  from  exporting  are  given  by 
xi i xi xi f w r × - = s j j p / ) ( ) (  where  j j i ij xi L P w r b rj t j
s s 1 1 ) / ( ) (
- - =  is the export revenue. There is a 
critical productivity threshold 
*
xi j  where such a firm just breaks even on the export market, i.e. 
xi i xi xi xi xi f w r s j j p = Û = ) ( 0 ) (
* * . We call this the export ZCPC. Furthermore, a manufacturing 
firm  from  country  i  that  serves  her  home  market  i  derives  profits  i i i i f w r - = s j j p / ) ( ) (  
where  i i i i L P w r b j r j
s s 1 1 ) / ( ) (
- - =  is  the  associated  revenue.  The  cutoff 
*
i j  where  this  firm 
breaks even is defined by  i i i i i i f w r s j j p = Û = ) ( 0 ) (
* * . We call this the domestic ZCPC. The 
revenue  equations  imply  a  link  between  export  cutoffs  and  domestic  cutoffs, 
* ) 1 /( *
F H xH t W j j
s s - - =  and 
* ) 1 /( *
H F xF t W j j
s s - =  where  ( )
) 1 /( 1 /
- º
s t j xi ij i f f t  is a measure of trade 
costs  (see  appendix  C).  Throughout  the  paper  we  impose  the  assumption 11 
( ) ( )
1 * * 1 / / /
- - >
s s s j j t j i i j ij j xi w w f f  to ensure that only firms that produce in the domestic market 
can export (i.e.  i xi j j >
* ). 
The free entry condition (FEC) for country i commands that firms enter the market until the 





























. The first term 
on the LHS formalizes the expected profits on the domestic market and the second term the 
expected profits on the export market where  ) ( 1
*
xi xi G prob j - =  denotes the probability for a 
productivity draw high enough to enter the export market. The RHS expresses the entry costs. 
The international equilibrium is determined by the following conditions (see appendix D): 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ,
* ) 1 /( * * * = - + º
- -
eH F H H xH H H H F H f t W j f j f H j j j j
s s  
    ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ,
* ) 1 /( * * * = - + º
-
eF H F F xF F F F F H f t W j f j f F j j j j
s s       (8) 




s d g d g j i i i ∫ ∫
¥ - ¥
- º
* * ) ( ) (
1 * * .  
In what follows we assume that the countries must not be too different such that positive and 
meaningful cutoff productivities and exit rates exist for both countries (see appendix E). 
4  Business exits in the open economy 
We assume that the two countries are diversified in production before and after trade. Section 
4.1 begins with the impact of trade opening on national average exit risks. Section 4.2 addresses 
the impact of trade integration, and section 4.3 analyses the role of business conditions and 
policy reforms. 
4.1  The evolution of exits risks from autarky to trade 
A  comparison  of  the  equilibrium  conditions  under  international  trade  in  eq.  (8)  and  under 
autarky (7) immediately implies 
PROPOSITION 2. (Country-specific default risk under trade). Trade opening decreases the 
the expected (average) risk of business exit of a country.  
Proof: The functions  ( )
*
i i j j  and  ( )
*
xi i j j  are decreasing functions in 
* j  (see appendix B). Hence, 
the  cutoff  under  international  trade 
*
i j  is  greater  than  under  autarky.  Using 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
1 * * 1 /
-
+ = > j j j j d k k E  immediately implies Prop. 2. ■ 12 
Opening up to trade forces the least productive firms to exit the market, so that the average 
productivity of the economy rises. As more productive firms have a lower risk of market exit, 
the expected risk of business exit must decrease. 
4.2  Business exits under trade integration 
How is the country-specific exit rate affected by trade liberalization? We start with the case of 
unilateral trade integration where one country (say  j ) allows firms located in i better access to 
its consumers. Such unilateral integration is captured by reductions in variable trade costs  ij t  
and/or by reductions in the fixed export costs  xi f . Our results are summarized in: 
PROPOSITION 3. (Default risks under unilateral trade integration). A unilateral reduction 
in variable and/or fixed trade costs to serve market  j  leads to a higher average default risk in 
country  j  and to a lower exit risk in country i. 
Proof: The claim follows by implicit differentiation of eqs. (8) to obtain the effects of  ij t  and 
xi f  on 
*
i j  and 
*
j j  (see appendix E) and by making use of  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
1 * * 1 /
-
+ = > j j j j d k k E . ■ 
Proposition 3 gives the remarkable insight that the country-specific default risks depend on the 
level of trade integration. This theoretical insight is, to the best of our knowledge, completely 
novel and has not yet been explored empirically. Granting firms located in country i  better 
access to consumers located in country  j  (by reductions in variable and/or fixed export costs) 
raises the profitability to produce manufacturing varieties in country i. This stimulates entry 
and tightens competition in i. The least productive firms are driven out of the market in i, so 
that the average default risk in i falls. The foreign market, instead, becomes less profitable for 
local  (foreign)  firms.  This  reduces  the  incentive  for  foreign  firms  to  enter  the  market. 
Competition is thus weakened resulting in a reduction in the foreign productivity cutoff which 
raises the average exit risk in  j . 
We now analyze the case of a symmetric reduction in trade costs  0 < = F H t d t d . This may 
comprehend a reduction in variable (iceberg) trade costs and/or a reduction in fixed costs to 
serve the foreign market (since  0 / > ¶ ¶ ij i t t  and  0 / > ¶ ¶ xi i f t , respectively). We obtain: 
PROPOSITION 4. (Default risks under symmetric trade integration). If countries differ 
strongly  with  respect  to  business  conditions,  a  symmetric  reduction  in  trade  costs 
( 0 < = F H t d t d )  increases  the  average  default  risk  of  the  country  which  has  an  aggregate 13 
disadvantage in business conditions, whereas the other country’s exit risk decreases. Otherwise, 
both countries exhibit lower national exit risks. 
Proof. To prove the claim we totally differentiate  ( ) j i i i t t ,
* * j j = , impose  0 > = F H t d t d , take the 
derivatives of the equilibrium cutoffs  i i t ¶ ¶ /
* j  and  j i t ¶ ¶ /
* j  for  j i,  and then explore the sign of 
the derivatives (see appendix E). ■ 
Propositions 3 and 4 establish a link between trade and trade infrastructure policy and national 
average exit risks. While unilateral policy measures have an unambiguous impact on business 
risks at the country level, this does not hold true for symmetric (bilateral) policy measures. 
Rather, a comprehensive set of business factors determines the sign and the strength of this link. 
4.3  Business conditions and exit risks  
An inspection of eqs. (8) makes it evident that the international equilibrium depends on a set of 
business conditions. In this section we analyze the link between national business conditions 
and the average risk of market exit. We obtain: 
PROPOSITION 5. (Country-specific default risk under international trade). The expected 
risk of business exit in country i,  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
1 * * 1 /
-
+ = > i i k k E j j j j d , (i) is independent of country 
sizes  i L  and  j L , (ii) increases when entry investment  ei f  is higher, when the domestic wage  i w  
is higher, and when the technological potential is smaller, and (iii) increases when foreign entry 
investment  ej f  is  lower,  when  the  foreign  wage  j w  decreases,  and  when  the  foreign 
technological potential increases. 
Proof. The proof follows the one we gave for Proposition 3 (see also appendix E). ■ 
Intuitively, any improvement in business conditions in country i, such as a better technology 
potential,  lower  entry  investments  and  lower  wages,  raises  the  profitability  of  the  domestic 
market and gives local firms a competitive edge over their foreign competitors. This stimulates 
entry in country i and reduces the incentive to enter the manufacturing industry in country  j , 
which sets in a selection effect that leads to higher cutoffs and a lower average exit risk in i and 
lower cutoffs and a higher average exit risk in  j . 
In  contrast  to  the  factors  considered  in  proposition  5  changes  in  the  domestic  fixed  labor 
investment necessary to serve the domestic market have an ambiguous effect on national default 
risks as stated in:  14 
PROPOSITION 6. (The effect of domestic fixed labor investment). An increase in domestic 
fixed labor investment ( i f ) leads to (i) a decrease in the domestic expected exit rate iff the 
domestic market is sufficiently protected from foreign competition, i.e. if market access to its 
market is sufficiently costly, and  (ii) an unambiguous decrease in the  expected exit rate in 
country  j . 
Proof. The method of proof follows the one employed to prove the previous propositions. ■ 
Proposition 6 shows a remarkable difference to our finding for the closed economy.  In the 
closed economy, an increase in  f  necessarily drives up the productivity cutoff due to a stronger 
selection effect and reduces the expected exit rate. In the open economy, an increase in  i f  has a 
further effect, it facilitates the access of foreign firms to the domestic market, as  0 / < i j df dt . 
This implies a competitive disadvantage for domestic firms vis-à-vis their foreign competitors 
whose effect it is to reduce the incentive to enter the domestic market and, hence, to raise the 
domestic expected insolvency risk. This leads to the ambiguity. However, the impact on the 
foreign expected exit risk is negative, as firms from  j  now enjoy a comparative advantage. 
Propositions 5 and 6 reveal a crucial link between policy reforms and average exit risks. In 
practice, the necessary fixed investments to start and do business are associated with a country's 
level of corruption, the costs to enforce contracts, the costs to provide protection against crime, 
product piracy and product imitation. Technology policies have an influence on a country's 
technological potential. Furthermore, proposition 6 carries the important message for empirical 
research that changes in the fixed input to do business are not unambiguously related to average 
exit risks. 
5  Discussion 
Our  theoretical  analysis  throws  up  a  number  of  sharp  and  interesting  predictions  which 
ultimately warrant closer empirical investigation. This section intends to give a first look at our 
predictions in the light of the data. A crucial problem that one encounters when moving from 
theory to empirics concerns the non-availability of comparable cross-country data on firm exits 
(in fact on firm dynamics, i.e. firm entry, exit and turnover, more broadly). Great efforts have 
been made to develop statistics on firm dynamics in many countries in recent years (see Dunne 
et al. 2009). These efforts have largely been independent, however, and so the data  reflect 
strong country idiosyncrasies. For example, in contrast to Germany, countries like Spain, Italy 
and Greece do not embrace small enterprises in their statistics. Hence their insolvency rates are 15 
biased downwards. Moreover, in these Mediterranean countries firms often choose less formal 
and  juridical  ways  to  deal  with  bankruptcy  which  are  also  not  included  in  the  data  (e.g.  a 
settlement  or  a  moratorium,  see  CreditReform  2007,  2009).  An  important  recent  initiative 
involving researchers from more than 20 countries has started to standardize data definitions 
and to construct comparable statistics (see Bartelsmann et al., 2009). However, despite intensive 
efforts  measurement  differences  still  exist  as  Bartelsmann  et  al.  (2009)  point  out.
7 For  this 
reason the ensuing analysis builds on the CreditReform (2009) data that we already alluded to in 
the introduction and that involve perceived insolvency risks (PIR). Such perceptions have their 
own methodological weaknesses but they allow us to make cross-country comparisons.  
Before turning to the role of specific factors highlighted in our propositions it is worthwhile to 
look at the correlation between a country’s average productivity and its perceived insolvency 
risk.  In  our  model  the  average  productivity  of  domestic  firms  is  positively  related  to  the 
domestic cutoff productivity (see section 2.5) which itself is inversely related to a country’s 
expected risk of business exits (see section 4.1). The predicted negative relationship is clearly 
borne out by Figure 2(i) which depicts the PIR against the average gross value added per hour 
(we define and describe all our data in appendix F.) 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Turning to the role of trade liberalization Figure 2(ii) reveals that the trading across borders 
rank  (which  captures  the  ease  of  export  and  import  activities  of  local  firms)  is  positively 
correlated with the PIR. This is in the spirit of proposition 3 which predicts that a country’s 
default risk is lower the better its access to its trading partner.  
Moving on to particular business factors note that Figures 2(iii), 2(iv), 2(v) clearly bring out a 
positive correlation between the PIR and various measures of business entry costs, i.e. the ease 
of doing business rank, the number of days it takes to open a business and the cost and time to 
open  up  a  business  in  percent  of  the  GDP.  The  corruption  perception  index  which  can  be 
interpreted as an inverse measure of these business entry costs is negatively related to the PIR as 
shown in Figure 2(vi). Figure 2(vii) reveals a negative relationship between the R&D-spending 
in percent of the GDP, which take as a proxy for a country’s technology potential, and the PIR. 
                                                 
7 Bartelsmann et al. (2009: 3) state that "Some core cross-country comparisons will be problematic because of 
remaining possible measurement problems, but also because some firm-level indicators cannot be unequivocally 
linked to better or worst economic performance". They also conclude that "… harmonization [of data] is essential 
to conduct meaningful comparisons, but we acknowledge that our effort should probably be extended as there 
remain measurement problems [so that] simple comparisons of firm dynamics across countries remain difficult to 
interpret [...]"(Bartelsmann et al. 2009:44). 16 
The  correlations  documented  in  Figures  2(iii)  –  (vii)  are  consistent  with  the  prediction  of 
proposition 5. 
The relationship between country size, i.e. population, and the PIR is shown in Figure 2(viii). 
We see that the PIR is independent of the country size as predicted by proposition 5. Finally, 
Figure 2(ix) depicts the relationship between the PIR and purchasing power adjusted labour 
compensation  per  employee.  No  clear  pattern  emerges  here  in  contrast  to  the  prediction  of 
proposition 5. However, as the PIR is determined by many factors jointly, the contribution of a 
single factor may not become visible.
8 
The  correlations  show  that  many  of  the  predictions  of  our  theoretical  model  are  broadly 
consistent with readily available data for European countries. A number of caveats have to be 
made, however. First, it is hard to provide correlations for all factors that we have put under 
scrutiny in our theoretical model. This is particularly true for the transition from autarky to trade 
addressed in proposition 2 for which there are no available data. A similar problem applies to 
proposition 4 which involves a comprehensive indicator for business factors which is important 
under  trade  liberalization.  Second,  we  hasten  to  point  out  that  our  quick  view  on  the  data 
involves correlations but not causality. Clearly, solid econometric work is needed to tackle the 
causality  issue.  Finally,  further  and  better  data  which  overcome  measurement  problems 
hopefully become available in the near future to put the analysis on a better footing. It is also 
desirable to have a much broader sample of countries worldwide. 
6  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to recent research which focuses on the roles of policies and institutions 
as determinants of business exits. It sets up a general equilibrium model which allows to derive 
sharp  predictions  concerning  how  key  factors  which  shape  a  country’s  business  and  trade 
environment impact on the average default risk of firms. We show that the switch from autarky 
to  trade  reduces  the  country-specific  default  risk.  Unilateral  trade  liberalization  reduces  the 
default risk of countries whose firms gain better market access and increases the default risk of 
the liberalizing country. Multilateral trade liberalization reduces the risk of business exit in both 
countries if and only if they offer similar (overall) business conditions. Otherwise, the default 
risk in the country with ‘better’ business conditions falls whilst the opposite holds for the other 
country. We also show that a country’s default risk is independent of the size of its population 
                                                 
8 It should also be noted that the predictions of our theoretical model conform with the empirical findings 
documented in Greenaway et al. (2008) and Coucke and Sleuwaegen (2008). 17 
and the size of its trading partner. However, the country specific-default risk rises when entry 
investments  in  this  (the  other)  country  rise  (fall),  when  its  (the  other  country’s)  technical 
potential falls (rises) and when wage costs in this (the other) country rise (fall). The effect of an 
increase in the fixed investments necessary to supply the domestic market (i.e. for a distribution 
or  retailing  network)  on  a  country’s  default  risk  is  to  decrease  the  default  risk  if  trade  is 
sufficiently costly, whilst the default risk in the other country unambiguously falls. 
A first look at empirical data reveals that our predictions are consistent with the observations, 
i.e. the correlations between the perceived insolvency risk, that we use as a measure for the 
country-specific  default  risk,  and  various  business  conditions  correspond  to  our  theoretical 
predictions.  Thus,  our  model  is  a  promising  starting  point  for  further  and  deeper  empirical 
investigations. It is hoped that these investigations can draw on actual rather than perceived 
country default risks once comparable country data void of measurement problems are available. 
Clearly, a further task is to move on from the correlations that we offer in our first data look to 
an analysis of causality. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A  The free entry condition (FEC) in the closed economy 
From  ( ) ( ) wf r - = s j j p /  it follows that 
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Using  ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j
s ¢ ¢ =
- r r
1 /  and  ( ) ( ) j j j d j d / ¢ ¢ = , it holds true that  
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where  [ ] ( )
s s j j j j '
* = > E . Adding and subtracting  ( ) j d ¢ / f  on the RHS leads to  
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1 1 * * wf . 
Using  this  expression  in  the  value  of  entry,  ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] e
E f w G v × - > E × - =
* / * 1 j j j d j p j , 
equating this to zero and then solving for  ( ) j p ¢  gives the FEC stated in eq. (5). 
Appendix B – The equilibrium condition under autarky 
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium 
Consider  the  equilibrium  condition  under  autarky  ( ) e aut f j f = ×
* j where 
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¥ - ¥
- = º
* * ) ( ) ( ,
1 * * * * . The limits of the LHS are given by  
( ) [ ] 0 lim
*
1











j . By applying Leibniz’ rule, the slope of  ( )
* j j  is 















 which is unambiguously negative. To ensure the 







is fulfilled whenever  e f  is sufficiently small (i.e., the market entry cost are not be prohibitively 
high),  f  is sufficiently great (i.e., the average profits of active firms in the market defined by 
the ZCPC is not too small), s  is not too small and/or the mass of productive firms in the 
productivity lottery is not too small (which implicitly can be concluded from  ) (j g ). 
 
Comparative statics of the cutoff productivity  21 
Rewrite eq. (7) as  ( ) 0 ) (
* * = - × º f f j f h e aut aut j j . From the rules of implicit differentiation it 
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we conclude that  0
* < e aut df dj . By the same procedure, we find  0
* > df d aut j ,  0
* = dw d aut j  
and  0
* > s j d d aut . 
To analyze the impact of a greater technological potential, rewrite  ( ) ( )
* *, j j a g j  as follows 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
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b b a a b a E G E G j j  
Assume that distribution a dominates b  in terms of hazard rate stochastic dominance (HRSD), 
so  that  ( ) ( ) · · b hr a G G f .  It  then  follows  for  any  given  productivity  level 
* j  that 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
* * 1 1 j j b a G G - > - ,  and  with ( ) j j j
s s -
-1 * /  being  an  increasing  function  we  conclude 
that  [ ] [ ]
* * j j j j > · > > · b a E E .  Note  that  for  ( ) ¥ Î , 1 g ,  0
*











a E .  Hence, 
( ) ( )
* * j j b a j j >  so that the cutoff productivity is greater for HRSD technological potentials. 
Appendix C – The link between the productivity cutoffs in the open economy 
(i)  From  the  ZCP  conditions  it  follows  that  ( ) i i i i i i i f w L P r s b rj j
s
= =
-1 * *) (  and 
( ) xi i j j xi i ij xi xi f w L P w r s b rj t j
s s
= =
- - 1 1 * * / ) ( . Consequently, we have 
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Combining  (C1)  and  (C3)  leads  to 
* ) 1 /( *
F H xH t W j j
s s - - =  and 
* ) 1 /( *
H F xF t W j j
s s - =  where 
( )
) 1 /( 1 /
- º
s t i xi ij i f f t . 
(ii) We assume that only firms that serve the domestic market can export, i.e. 
* *
i xi j j > . From 
(C3) it follows that this holds true whenever  ( ) ( )( ) 1 / / /
) 1 /( 1 ) 1 /( 1 >
- - s s t j i j i i xi ij L L P P f f . Substituting 
( ) ( )
1 * ) 1 /( ) 1 /( 1 /
- - - = i i i i i w f L P rj s b
s s s  and rearranging yields  ( ) ( )
1 * * 1 / / /
- - >
s s s j j t j i i j ij j xi w w f f . 
Note that in Demidova (2008) the condition 
* *
i xi j j >  implies 
* *
j xi j j >  (i.e. that a domestic firm 
finds it easier to break even in its domestic market than a foreign exporter does) since her model 
assumes  1 = W .  However,  in  the  presence  of  a  possibly  large  wage  differential  it  is  quite 
conceivable that an exporting firm might find it easier to break even than a local firm does. 
Hence, the implication will not carry over to our model, in general. 
Appendix D: The equilibrium condition in the open economy 
The free entry condition (FEC) for country i is given by  
  ( ) ( )
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j     (D1) 
As  ( ) ( ) i i i i f w r - = s j j p / , we can write the expected profits as (compare appendix A) 
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where  [ ]
s s j j j j
/ 1 *
i i > E º ¢  and  [ ]
s s j j j j
/ 1 *
xi xi > E º ¢ . Note that both parameters are calculated 
using the lottery distribution. 
The  zero  cutoff  profit  conditions  (ZCPCs)  are  defined  by  i i i i i i f w r s j j p = Û = ) ( 0 ) (
* *  and 
xi i xi xi xi xi f w r s j j p = Û = ) ( 0 ) (
* * . Using the relation  ( ) ( ) ( )
* 1 * / j j j j
s
r r
- ¢ = ¢ , the ZCPC can be 
rewritten  as  ( ) ( ) [ ] i i i i i i f w 1
1 * - ¢ = ¢
- s
j j j p  (domestic  ZCPC)  and  ( ) ( ) [ ] xi i xi xi xi xi f w 1
1 * - ¢ = ¢
- s
j j j p  
(export  ZCPC).  Plugging  these  expressions  into  (D1),  substituting  ( ) j j d ¢ = ¢ / 1 , 
[ ] [ ] ) ( 1 ) ( '
* *
* j j j j j j j E j
j
s s s G d g - = > º ∫
¥
 and  [ ] [ ] ) ( 1 ) (
* *
* j j j j j j j
j G d g E - = > ∫
¥
 and 23 
finally  using  the  link  between  domestic  and  export  cutoffs, 
* ) 1 /( *
F H xH t W j j
s s - - =  and 
* ) 1 /( *
H F xF t W j j
s s - = , yields the equilibrium conditions as stated in eqs. (8). 
Appendix E: Comparative statics under international trade 
The comparative statics of the national cutoffs are determined by applying Cramer’s rule to the 
system of equations defined in eqs. (8). This system can be rewritten as  
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 and  i J  the 
determinant of matrix  i J  in which the column vector on the RHS of eq. (E1) is substituted for 
the i-th column in  J . Applying Leibniz’ rule, the partial derivates are given by: 
0
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As we assume throughout the paper that 
* *
i xi j j > , the integrals of the subtrahend are smaller 
than those of the minuend. With  1 > ij t , it immediately follows that  0 > J . 
Unilateral trade integration 
We find that  ( )
0 ) (
1
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 where  ( )
) 1 /( 1 - =
s t H xH HF H f f t  and  ( )
) 1 /( 1 - =





































.  Hence,  if  a  country  facilitates  the 
access to its market (i.e.  H dt -  or  F dt -  or in terms of smaller fixed export costs), its cutoff 
productivity decreases whereas the cutoff productivity of the other country rises.  
Symmetric trade integration 
By  total  differentiation  of  ( ) F H H H t t ,













* * * j j j
. More specifically, we find that  
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,  whenever 
0 ) ( ) (
* * 1 *
1 *




























This is the case whenever the two countries have similar business conditions, which is reflected 
by  similar  cutoff  productivities  (i.e.  1
* * » F H j j )  or  whenever  country  H  has  a  strong 
comparative advantage, i.e.  1
* * >> F H j j . If country H  has a strong comparative disadvantage 
so that  1
* * << F H j j , symmetric trade integration decreases  country  H ’s cutoff productivity, 
whereas the cutoff of country F  increases due to symmetry. 
Changes in business conditions 
Using  Cramer’s  rule  we  find  that  0 /
* < ¶ ¶ ei i f j  and  0
* > ¶ ¶ ej i f j ,  0
* > ¶ ¶ W H j  and 
0




If the technological potential of country H  increases in the sense of HRSD, the value of the 
equilibrium  condition  ( )
* * , F H H j j  increases  in  the  short-run  (see  appendix  B  for  a  proof), 
whereas the equilibrium condition  ( )
* * , F H F j j  remains unchanged. Consequently, 
*
H j  increases 
and 
*
F j  decreases. 
Existence and uniqueness of an international equilibrium 
In equilibrium, both conditions stated in eqs. (8) have to be fulfilled. Furthermore, due to the 
assumptions about the lottery distribution it must hold true that  1
* > i j . From the comparative 
statics we know that the domestic cutoff decreases with domestic disadvantages and foreign 
advantages. Hence, we assume that the countries must not be too different in aggregate (as a 
disadvantage with respect to factor can be compensated by an advantage with respect to another) 
to generate positive and meaningful cutoff productivities. 
Appendix F – Data Sources 
Data  on  the  perceived  insolvency  risks  are  provided  by  CreditReform  (2009).  The  R&D 
spendings in percent of GDP in 2000 are from Bohnstedt et. al. (2010). We use the population 
sizes provided by the national bureaus of statistics. The Corruption Perception Index 2009 is 
taken  from  the  Transparency  International  Website.  The  greater  the  index,  the  less  is  the 
perceived level of corruption. Days as well as cost and time to open up a business are provided 
by Djankov et. al. (2002). We take the data about labour compensation per employee calculated 
in 2008 USD at PPP from the OECD database provided on their website. The Ease of Doing 
Business rank and the Trading Across Borders rank are taken from the World Doing Business 
Report (World Bank 2010). A high ranking (i.e. indices closer to one) means that the business 
environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm. The Trading Across 
Borders rank captures the ease of export and import activities of local firms. It captures the 
number of official procedures, the time between the initiation of a shipment and its completion 
(including waiting time, excluding ocean transport time) and official fees. Further information is 
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Source: Creditreform (2009). Germany is indexed 100. 
 
 























Please note that due to different data availability Eastern Europe does not embrace the same set 
of countries in each figure. Furthermore, the values for the Baltic States, Benelux, Scandinavia 
and Eastern Europe are calculated as unweighted country averages.
Benelux  Germany  France (main land)  Russia (European part) 
UK  Italy  Spain  Baltic States 
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